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Abstract
In an effort to understand how supremacists may respond to future socio-political
events, this article examines how White Aryan Resistance (WAR), as a major
player in the White Supremacist Movement (WSM), conceptualises nationalism
andwho qualifies as a ‘real’American. I use discourse analysis on two year’s worth
of WAR newsletters: twelve monthly issues before the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks and twelve issues after this date. Only partial support is found for
outcomes that the existing nationalism literature would predict, suggesting that
those who research the right-wing must better understand the WSM’s sense of
status loss to adequately predict future violent action from these groups. I show
that WAR did not increasingly target Arabs after the attacks, which may have
enhanced their membership and mobilisation efforts, but that this decision was a
rational response in the context of status threats and limited movement resources.
Introduction
Nationalism generally refers to feelings of belonging that individuals have toward
their national groups, which may be demarcated by physical boundaries of a state
or by imagined boundaries of ethnicity, culture, or religion. I examine how an
important component of theWhite SupremacistMovement (WSM) –White Aryan
Resistance (WAR) – conceptualises nationalism and how this understanding
influenced their response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11).
Understanding WAR’s version of nationalism helps link previous literatures on
nationalism and white supremacy.Analysing WAR’s response to 9/11 allows us to
better predict when unpopular movements may mobilise or expand following
events of national importance. This may additionally help us understand why
supremacist groups choose particular targets for violent activity, which is useful
information for law enforcement agencies seeking to prevent such violence.
* Amy Cooter is a sociology Ph.D. candidate at the University of Michigan and is a
recipient of a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship. Her research
interests include the examination of how conservative movements and organisations
navigate the broader socio-political arena. She is currently studying the modern militia
movement.
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The White Supremacist Movement
It is important to note that organised white supremacist activity may be conceptu-
alised as part of a larger social movement. Although some researchers resist using
the term ‘movement’ to refer to ‘regressive’ or right-wing collective behaviour,
Kathleen Blee (2003), Jessie Daniels (1997), andAbby Ferber (1999), three of the
foremost authors on white racist groups, are among those acknowledging aWhite
Supremacist Movement.1 Organised white supremacist activity should be consid-
ered a social movement for the following reasons. Definitions of social movements
typically resemble Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper’s statement that, ‘Social move-
ments are conscious, concerted, and sustained efforts by ordinary people to change
some aspect of their society by using extra-institutional means’ (Goodwin and
Jasper 2009:3). Social movements have some continuity over time, and some
researchers may be uncomfortable with the WSM’s relatively consistently low
level of activity. Low activity is not equivalent to no activity, particularly when
white supremacist activity spikes in response to major social change like the
election of the country’s first black president. Even very successful movements
have varying degrees of group cohesiveness and action over time (Stryker, Owens,
and White 2000).
Some scholars may object to the characterisation of the WSM as a social
movement because of its relatively small membership base. However, groups that
require a high degree of trust due to the nature of their beliefs and activities have
incentives to remain small and may have a higher than normal proclivity for
ousting members who fall out of favour with the group (Bernstein 1997; Gamson
1997).This can be seen in religious sects as mainstream as Catholics orMethodists
(Stark and Finke 2000). Size alone is not sufficient grounds for discounting
movement status. Finally, a frequent complaint about social movements literature
generally is that it tends to only study successful social movements; at worst, the
WSM is unsuccessful at accomplishing meaningful social change. Lack of success
does not violate movement status, and studying the WSM may add to the social
movements literature because of the few studies of unsuccessful movements.
White Aryan Resistance and Tom Metzger
There are many groups of various sizes within the largerWSM, and they are active
across the globe. Some groups have utilised these international connections in
various ways (e.g., on the role of the internet for maintaining an international
movement, Back 2002) – a topic deserving of its own study – but WAR has
remained focused on a domestic strategy.As a guest author in one of its newsletters
notes, ‘WAR has often stated that you confine your activities to the US and urge
other Americans to do the same, which is a sensible, sound policy in view of
Europe’s race laws’ (An Irish Londoner 2001:6).
It is true that the international picture is made extremely complicated by varying
national laws restricting WSM activity (Anti-Defamation League n.d.), and it is
why my focus here is on theWSM in the United States. However, it is important to
note thatWAR’s founder and leader TomMetzger believes that these laws weaken
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both the scope and aspirations of the movement in other countries, making
racially-aware whites in the United States superior to supremacists elsewhere, in
his view. According to Metzger (2000:3), ‘only a tiny minority are willing to
sacrifice themselves in an attempt to stop [a non-white invasion] . . . there is no
support from outside the country for any such action. Europe and Russia have their
own problems.’
Precise goals and ideology may vary across groups of the WSM, but they have
in common a belief in the superiority of the white race, a hatred for non-whites, and
a desire for a socio-political environment where white men have exclusive power.
WAR represents one of the more extreme groups in theWSM, and has been linked
to a variety of racially motivated violence including the brutal murder of Ethiopian
student Mulugeta Seraw in 1988 (Langer 2003), links to the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing (Stern 1996), the likely involvement in the 2005 attempted murder of
District Court Judge Joan Lefkow (Southern Poverty Law Center 2005), and 2009
connections to and support for the shooter at Washington D.C.’s Holocaust
Museum (Metzger 2009).
WAR should be understood as a largely Neo-Nazi group2 (Berlet and Vysotsky
2006; George and Wilcox 1996), which are typically considered to be newer
groups, relative to the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), for example, with on-average
younger members who admire Adolf Hitler, Nazi Germany, and its symbols;
WAR’s most recognised symbol is that of a large, snarling wolf whose pupils have
been replaced by swastikas. As Chip Berlet and Stanislov Vysotsky (2006) note,
WAR should be understood as a political, rather than religious or youth cultural
group within the WSM, but their appeal to youth should not be overlooked. Most
WAR members are between thirteen and twenty-five years old (Anti-Defamation
League n.d.), and it is believed that many members join otherWSM groups as they
age out of groups likeWAR (Hamm 1993).The young age and early indoctrination
of WAR members is likely one factor that contributes to its violence.
Studying more problematic components of the WSM like WAR that have a
proclivity for trying to effect social change through violent action – as opposed to
groups that merely complain about similar issues – can lead to a better understand-
ing of which WSM groups and actions should receive the most law enforcement
attention. WAR’s relative transparency through their distribution of items like the
newsletters analysed here also allows for investigation of beliefs likely held by
other WSM groups that are not as forthright or easily accessed. My claim is not
thatWAR’s response to 9/11 necessarily represents how everyWSMgroup reacted
to this event, but rather that WAR’s perspectives represent theWSM attitudes that
are most socially problematic. Understanding the most problematic and violent
components of the movement is critical for allocating law enforcement’s limited
resources.
WAR was started by Tom Metzger, who is now considered a demagogue of the
entire WSM. Some argue that, for all practical purposes, Metzger and WAR are
synonymous. This may be true, but Metzger’s visibility and importance in the
larger WSM are undeniable. His successes as well as failures have shaped how
other groups in the movement have strategised, recruited, and mobilised members,
and it is useful to understand more about his background due to his role as creator
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and editor of the newsletters. Metzger was born in 1938 in Indiana, and little is
known about him until he was drafted into the United States Army following high
school. Although he quickly achieved the rank of corporal, his stint in the military
was brief (Anti-Defamation League 2002; Hamm 1993), and Metzger joined the
John Birch Society3 soon after ending his army career in 1961.
Finding the Society less reactionary and violent than he desired, Metzger spent
the next decade shifting his affiliation from one supremacist group to another until
starting his own organisation called theWhite Brotherhood. This organisation was
intended to be a kind of racist army that would perpetrate violent acts against
minorities in California, where Metzger then resided. Apparently finding his
Brotherhood ineffective, Metzger and his Brotherhood joined the Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan, led by David Duke, in 1974. Only four years later, Metzger and
Duke had a falling out: Metzger wanted to advocate and initiate violence against
non-whites, while Duke was unwilling to do so (Hamm 1993). Metzger then
established and led a group called the California Knights of the KKK, dabbled in
politics, and served as a minister for a Christian Identity church.4 By 1980,
Metzger was facing pressure from both KKK leaders and mainstream politicians
because of his extremist views. He changed the name of his organisation, first, in
1980 to the White American Political Association, and again in 1983 to White
Aryan Resistance – WAR (ibid.). At the same time, he began to publish the
newsletter analysed here, also titled WAR.
In 1988, Metzger’s dream almost ended when three WAR adherents beat
Mulugeta Seraw, an Ethiopian immigrant studying in the United States, to death
and said their actions were a result of the victim’s race. Metzger initially praised
the actions of the murderers, and the Southern Poverty Law Center brought a
wrongful death civil suit on behalf of Seraw’s family against Metzger and his son
John, who had become a notable WAR actor. The Metzgers chose to represent
themselves at trial, and in 1990, a jury rendered a $12.5 million verdict against
them and WAR. To this day, the Metzger’s wages are garnished as part of the
settlement (Langer 2003).
The lawsuit certainly was a shock to the entire WSM, limited WAR’s ability to
be politically active, and likely sent many sympathisers underground. However, the
verdict also heightened many WSM members’ sympathy for Metzger and further
aggravated their feelings of being unfairly treated by the criminal justice system
and government generally. Despite the verdict, Metzger did not halt production of
his newsletter, and it has been printed quarterly or monthly since its inception in
1983, although the current version is in electronic format and has been renamed
The Insurgent. WAR as an organisation, while weakened following the civil
verdict, is far from dead, and like many of its fellowWSMgroups, has experienced
a resurgence of interest and possibly membership in the wake of the economic
downturn and election of the United States’ first African-American president.
Theoretical Background – Nationalism
There are continuing debates about the nature and definition of nationalism. Some
authors, for example, focus on nationalism’s political nature (e.g., Gellner 1983),
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some highlight its cultural aspects (e.g., Hobsbawm 1992; Smith 1996), and others
demonstrate how extreme forms of ‘ultra-nationalism’ may lead to violence to
protect the interests of those in power (e.g., Billig 1989; Payne 1996:14). It is John
Breuilly’s definition of nationalism that I rely on here, because of its simultaneous
attention to nationalism’s political focus and its ability to recursively influence
collective identity. Breuilly also recognises that not all constituents of a given
nationmay be content with its present form, and indicates that social actors can use
identity-based nationalistic appeals in attempts to undermine and shift in their
favour the power of the existing state. The definition is as follows:
‘[N]ationalism’ . . . refer[s] to political movements seeking or exercising
state power and justifying such actions with . . . political doctrine[s] built
upon three basic assertions:
(a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.
(b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other
interests and values.
(c) The nation must be as independent as possible.
(Breuilly 1982:3)
First, WAR members are ideally seeking to co-opt state power – the power to
define whites as Americans and others as not, while at the same time influencing
other whites, including politicians, to agree with and enforce this definition. The
degree of desired enforcement varies somewhat across subgroups of Neo-Nazis,
and ranges from the yearning for a separate UnitedWhite States within the current
U.S. boundaries, to the total extermination of all non-whites presently in the
country.WAR favours the latter (see, e.g., ‘How can I help stop Blacks from taking
America . . . ? The answer is simple. Kill them all’, WAR 2000b:4).
Second, WAR construes the United States’ ‘explicit and peculiar character’ as
founded, built, and civilised by whites, for whites. In its true form, they say, the
United States is the paragon of intellectual, technological, and other advancement,
but the greatness of the state has been hampered by the large numerical presence of
non-whites. Third, WAR’s stated key goal is the preservation of the white race.
They believe that the presence of non-whites in the United States not only hampers
the nation, but imminently threatens the very existence of whites because of
interracial marriage and crime. Members say that the preservation of the race
should be every white person’s primary concern, and that it should take priority
over individual or family concerns. In WAR’s words, as included in a page of
ideological statements that remain constant across newsletter issues, ‘The great
White Aryan race must be advanced and protected at all costs and above all other
interests.’ Fourth, and as part of the effort to both maintain the race and restore the
ideal version of the state, WAR strongly opposes international cooperation, either
in the form of the United Nations, or through international trade and labour
exportation.
The extreme nature of WAR’s ideal, racialised nation as explained above should
be reminiscent of the distinction between civic and ethnic nations (Brubaker
1992).5 Citizenship status in civic nations is typically governed by the principle of
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jus soli. That is, individuals gain citizenship by being born within the physical
boundaries of the state and by presumably ideologically supporting the nation’s
agreed upon moral and political principles regarding rights and responsibilities.
For example, the United States is considered to be a civic nation whose citizens
typically live within the physical geographical boundaries recognised as belonging
to the state, and whose citizens are expected to uphold ideals such as freedom and
equality, which are considered central to the nation’s principles.
Conversely, legal membership in ethnic nations is determined solely by ances-
try. An example of this is Germany in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Individuals were not considered citizens of the German state merely because they
were born within its boundaries – instead, they must have been born into families
considered German by heredity, according to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Similarly, children of immigrants could never have been considered truly German,
and offspring of German families abroad would have been considered German
even if they had never set foot within the boundaries demarcating the physical
state.
However, while nations are often considered to be either civic or ethnic,
clear-cut distinctions do not always exist. Some researchers argue, for example,
that the United States cannot be considered a wholly civic nation because despite
the shared rhetoric of equal opportunity, great economic and other disparities
remain between the majority white population and minority non-white groups
(Fenton 2006). Others emphasise that the civic–ethnic distinction should never be
overly reified because the concepts should be understood as ideal types on opposite
ends of a heuristic continuum (Zubrzycki 2002). Real nations, in other words,
necessarily incorporate both political/civic and cultural/ethnic distinctions. In
practice, the United States may thus be considered a largely civic nation, within
which ethnic boundaries are often salient.
It is in this milieu that WAR operates. Members of this and other white
supremacist groups are certainly aware of the civic myths of equality and diversity
that permeate the current understanding of the United States as a nation. As
members of the larger WSM, however, they interpret their own interpersonal
interactions from an ethnicised standpoint, and desire an ethnic definition for the
nation through their frequent expression of a belief that American citizenship
should only be synonymous with whiteness.
GivenWARmembers’ yearning for this idealised all-white state that works only
for whites’ perceived best interests, it is also useful to include Anderson’s (2006)
concept of imagined communities. ‘Imagined communities’ refers to those that
exist largely in the collective mind of its members; they are the result of shared
understandings of what a particular nation and its customs should be. Anderson
intended for the concept of imagined communities to apply to existing nations, for
even within these, it is impossible for members to know all other members of the
nation, and the nation’s degree of sovereignty and community may in reality differ
from the shared image of those principles that its constituents hold.
InWAR’s case, ‘imagined’ is a bit more literal than this, as their desired version
of the state does not (and in fact, cannot) exist in reality. This does not, however,
prevent WAR members from envisioning themselves as part of a larger collective
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of racially pure white people who want to be part of an all-white state that works to
preserve white interests. Finally, Anderson privileged the role of printed media in
facilitating communication and increasing the perceived bond among members of
an imagined community. While WAR’s newsletters serve this function, it should
not be forgotten that there are also vast online networks that enable continual
facilitation and reinforcement of white supremacists’ sense of community (Adams
and Roscigno 2005; Futrell and Simi 2004).
Theoretical Background – WSM Literature
Other WSM researchers have explored the roles that gender and especially mas-
culinity play for recruitment to and involvement in the movement (Blee 2003;
Ferber 1999). JamesAho6 (1990) and RoryMcVeigh (2009) are among the authors
who privilege the role of economic and political anomie in understanding involve-
ment in extremism. In Seymour Lipset and Earle Raab’s (1978:155) reverse
formulation of status loss called ‘status preservatism’, groups that are losing status
– either concretely, in the form of economic status, or more diffusely in the form of
social capital – attempt to maintain or regain this status by aligning themselves
with groups that had prestige at some point in the past. Debra Oswald (2005)
discusses how symbolic, as well as real, threats to identity can invoke prejudice
and exclusionary behaviour.
White supremacist examples of this would perhaps be more clear-cut during
the height of the Klan’s popularity in the 1920s when racism was more socially
acceptable and the Klan was seen as a visible, active, and powerful political
group (McVeigh, Myers, and Sikkink 2004); however, modern white suprema-
cist members still find identity support in joining groups that seek to re-affirm
the value of whiteness7 even if those groups currently have less socio-political
power. Other researchers (Adamson 2000; Olzak and Shanahan 2003) have illus-
trated how white solidarity and even violence, particularly among youth, can
result from perceived threats to white dominance in a variety of arenas ranging
from neighbourhoods and housing to local job opportunities. This again can be
attributed to perceived status loss or relative deprivation to non-white groups,
and is linked to the concept of ethnic competition as explained by Susan Olzak
(1992).
Jessie Daniels’ (1997) perspective essentially combines the gender and status-
loss trains of thought by linking supremacist notions of white masculine identity to
movement understandings of the nation, while discussing the role of fear of
outsiders and loss of control. She indicates that theWSM’s notion of the nation ‘is
synonymous with “whiteness” and working – or middle-class masculinity . . . [it]
is fragmented and subsumed under “race”’ (Daniels 1997:36–37). However, she
does not discuss how this notion of the nation relates to existing nationalism
literature or the potential ability to anticipate future WSM action. Colin Flint
(2004:171) discusses ethnic nationalism and diaspora with reference to WSM
examples, and speculates that public condemnation of WSM violent activity may
in fact reinforce and encourage further violence, rather than reduce it. I suggest
this could occur because WSM activists interpret disapproval from officials or
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others who supposedly represent non-white interests as further support for their
violent expressions of alienation. To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to
empirically draw implications for WSM behaviour, as well as ideology, by evalu-
ating change following a major socio-political event like 9/11. My work is
intended to be a complement to that of the above authors.
Data and Methods
The internet’s role in promulgating white supremacist ideology should not be
underestimated (see, e.g., Daniels 2009); however, newsletters are a more appro-
priate data source thanWAR’s online content for this purpose.WAR’s newsletters
are targeted toward existing, subscribing members, who presumably agree with
WAR’s ideology, rather than a more ambivalent public accessing their website.
Newsletters therefore reflect WAR’s ideology in its purest form; ideology is not
softened in an effort to make it more palatable for potential recruits who are not yet
as extreme as existing WAR members, as is sometimes the case with online
content. Additionally, in 2001, it appears that greater time and effort was consist-
ently invested in the newsletters, as they had been continually produced for nearly
twenty years, while online content was (and is) only sporadically updated.
The general format of the WAR newsletter consists of sixteen pages of writing
and two or three fliers for racist T-shirts or jewellery. The front page is either a
political cartoon or picture of a movement member or opponent, along with the
contact information for WAR. An editorial by Tom Metzger is next, followed by a
page of brief statements about WAR’s standpoint on various issues. This page
remains constant across all newsletters in the sample, and the statements on this
page are the standard, ‘party line’ variety addressing fourteen different issues
ranging from race to religion to economics. Next are ‘letters to the editor’ and
Metzger’s responses, then a page of ‘news updates’ that are blurbs of interest or
continuations of questions directed toMetzger. Then are five pages with articles of
various lengths, typically written by ‘WAR associates’, although occasionally one
about some race-based conflict is taken directly from the Associated Press or
another news agency.
Six pages of advertisements for racist stickers, racist literature, CDs, and videos
with recorded racist radio shows or music, all of which may be purchased from
WAR, follow. Advertisements for racist memorabilia are not included in the
analysis because the items are almost identical across all issues in the sample, and
are comprised lists of one hundred or more titles with no detail as to content.
Finally, racist political cartoons are smattered throughout each newsletter, and
these are included in the analysis because they are clearly visible, are very
polarising, and typically relate directly back to the newsletter content.
I used a total of twenty-four monthly newsletters dating from September 2000 to
October 20028 in the analysis. Because of the small sample size, chi squared or
other statistical tests lack power here. Instead, I first used an approach similar to
semiotic clustering, a form of content analysis that strives for an understanding of
the culture of the group being studied (Barley 1983; Feldman 1994; Manning
1987; Tavory and Swidler 2009) to verify which concepts merited qualitative
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investigation. I then proceeded to a discourse analysis of these key themes.
Discourse analysis allows for a qualitative, contextual understanding of the text in
question that is more nuanced than what content analysis alone can provide, and
the newsletter quotations throughout this paper are representative of how the
concepts are reflected throughout the sample.
Nationalism
It may be unsurprising that supremacist groups like WAR have a framework for
understanding nationalism that is different from that of mostAmericans. However,
understanding exactly how and why their understanding is different is useful for
interpreting, and perhaps predicting, their response to events of national relevance.
For example:
It is good to be proud of your country and its history, but your country is not
your nation. Our Race is our Nation and the only nation we owe allegiance
to. For if our Race ceases to exist it will not matter one iota what lands it
resided in nor what it did while it was there.
(WAR 2000c:9)
This quote confirms howWAR desires an ethnic definition of the nation by seeing
‘race’ and ‘nation’ as synonymous and denying any importance of ‘the land’, or a
country’s physical boundaries.At the same time, it privileges race over any kind of
governmental or other authority, much as Daniels (1997) claimed. More explicitly,
a short article in the December 2001 newsletter reads:
‘Country’ means a place to visit.
‘Nation’ a people of common ancestry.
‘Sovereignty’means a people’s right to keep race and culture intact; a right
to self-determination.
‘America’ once meant ‘a people, a nation of common ancestry, practicing
and defending the idea of self-determination’.
(Associate 2001b:9)
Clearly, the proposed definition of nationalism again demonstrates an ethnic
interpretation of the nation. The definition of country shows ‘nation’and ‘country’
are not synonymous, but this time the implication runs deeper and flippantly
indicates that the idea of one’s country has no visceral meaning for WAR
members. The inclusion of sovereignty, whose definition is in contrast to WAR’s
claims that the white race is being overrun and controlled by other racial groups, is
meant to highlight this perceived fact and the disenfranchisement WAR members
feel. The past-tense definition of America reveals that WAR believes the United
States no longer is a white nation, and is therefore no longer a nation at all.
Other selections indicate thatWAR also does not view traditional symbols of the
nation, such as the American flag, in the same way as most Americans. They say,
for example, ‘The flag of our race is the swastika. The red and blue of the Jew flag
symbolizes the colors of the white race after being kicked and beaten by the
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fucking traitors in “our” government’ (Associate 2001c:5). Note the quotations
around the word ‘our’, illustrating how WAR does not feel the government
represents their interests, and note the use of the swastika as their racial-national
symbol.
FewAmericans seem to believe that the government intentionally works against
their best interests as WAR members do, and most responded quite differently to
the terror attacks. Following 9/11, the imagined community of patrioticAmericans
at least intensified, if not expanded, as many people from a variety of racial and
ethnic backgrounds gained a heightened awareness of their status asAmericans as
a result of the attacks. This was amplified by extended media coverage that
portrayed the terrorists as attacking all of ‘us’. Along with this heightened aware-
ness of collective ‘Americanness’, there was an almost immediate rise in patriotic
sentiment demonstrated through greater numbers of American flags being dis-
played in homes and businesses across the country, for example (see Li and Brewer
2004).
Arabs and 9/11
There was also a substantial rise in anti-Arab sentiment after 9/11 when the public
learned that men from the Middle East were responsible for the terror attacks
(Oswald 2005). Barbara Perry (2003) has discussed how there was long-standing
anti-Arab bias in the United States that only needed a polarising event to result in
an outbreak of violence, particularly when national leaders implicitly condone
such action. Daniel Christie (2006) has documented the large spike in anti-Arab
hate crimes following the attacks. Importantly, other scholars (e.g., Shaheen 2000;
Suad, D’Harlingue, and Wong 2008) have noted that many Americans conflate
‘Arab’ with ‘Muslim’, to the extent that anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment
should likely be considered equivalent; this is certainly true for WAR, as demon-
strated in quotations below.
WAR’s overallArab message is somewhat convoluted:Arabs are non-white and
therefore not accepted as equals, but at the same time, the actions of the Arab
terrorists are lauded as exemplars of ideal action in the vein of lone wolfing
advocated by the WSM.
I’m sorry (no, I suppose I’m not), but as a White person whose only goal is
the survival of my race, I will not turn to support a government that is killing
us just because some towel heads did what a white man should have done.
(Associate 2001c:5)
If a number of Muslims can create such havoc giving their lives for a cause,
why aren’t you doing more.
(Metzger 2002:8)
The perspective on 9/11 is clearer, as illustrated by two quotes fromTomMetzger:
[The prevalence of race mixing and inactive whites] is why I do not get
excited at all when an Arab crashes a plane into the Center Of World Trade
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Centers or into the Policing Power Pentagon Center that will support the
disease that is killing us at all costs.
(Metzger 2001b:2)
I am far more afraid of the Iron Heel Government than I am of any Middle
Eastern Arab. None of my friends have ever been killed by an Arab, but
several have been killed by agents of the Iron Heel.
(Metzger 2001c:2)
Taken altogether, these selections confirm that WAR members were little
impacted by the events of 9/11; because their ideal imagined community differs so
much from the nation in reality, the terror attacks were not perceived as a personal
affront to WAR constituents. Metzger explicitly says that he did not know anyone
who was killed on that day, so does not care about the thousands who died. In fact,
WAR as a whole sees the attacks as positive for two reasons: it was an attack on a
government, on a nation that does not represent white interests, and it was a model
for ideal action.
Violence and Mobilisation
WAR is no stranger to violence, and one of its most central ideologies is that of
‘worse is better’. Metzger says he borrows this from Vladimir Lenin and means
that the worse things become for more whites – the worse status loss they
experience – the more likely they are to band together with WAR’s cause and
demand change.9 This perspective, of course, assumes that all whites would have
the same racialised interpretation of harmful social events. Here is an instance
where a WAR subscriber indicates that riots, illegal immigration, and general
social disorder by non-whites will force more whites to racially-aware action:
I am of the opinion that it will only take one or possibly two really large
terror attacks on the scale of 9/11 to create chaos in this country. Starting in
large, non-white majority areas, they will instantly seize any breakdown of
order to rampage and pillage and thus force White men to act at last! Also,
any breakdown of the border security will bring a million muds over the
border all at once on a holiday scavenger hunt. That will send the dominoes
falling.
(Associate 2002:4)
As a result of this ‘worse is better’ philosophy, it would have been reasonable to
expect a shift to a more violent, action-based rhetoric in the newsletters following
9/11. Combined with increased out-group animosity among the general American
public, this could also have led to a more potent and successful WSM.
In other words, manyAmericans who are not part of theWSMmay nonetheless
hold racist beliefs (Kinder and Sears 1981). These people had a clearly identified
racial-cultural ‘other’against whom they could direct their frustration after 9/11. It
is possible that more people would have been accepting of some degree of
racially-motivated violence after the terror attacks. Christie’s (2006) work sup-
ports this, as does Figure 1, which shows the number of anti-Muslim (as a proxy
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for anti-Arab) hate crimes as a percent of all religion-motivated hate crimes from
1995 to 2007. There is a jump of more than 25% in the year 2001 compared to the
previous year.
Blacks and Jews
The content analysis revealed, however, thatWAR did not take this approach. They
neither advocated more violence, nor increased targeting ofArabs in their rhetoric.
Instead, WAR largely continued targeting blacks and Jews. References to blacks
are generally stereotypical slurs and dismissals of intellect or work ethic. Others
laud contemporary examples from the news of whites, especially women, who had
fended off black criminal offenders, and urge similar action, as in the following
example.
White Power needs to be restored to America. I can’t even walk in my own
neighborhood without being scared of a mugging, shooting, or stabbing. I
don’t act like I hate Blacks around people or friends, only on the Internet.
And I myself have been mugged three times and stabbed once and all three
times it was done by Blacks.
(WAR 2000a:3)
More extreme entries yearn for the systematic lynching policies of the past in
hopes of returning a sense of fear and race-based hierarchy to their communities.
Negative characterisations of Jews include stereotypical slurs and assessments
of physical undesirability and greediness, but primarily rely onWAR’s belief that
Figure 1. Chart of Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes, 1995–2007
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Jewish elites control the government and work to undermine white authority and
success.
As far as ‘rag heads’ being ‘much worse than the average American Jew,’
how could they be? The Jews are much worse than any of our enemies (with
the single exception ofWhite race traitors) because they are wily and clever,
and have enough intelligence and power to serve as the architects of our
ultimate destruction, if we allow them to do so, . . . [and will] demolish what
little is left of Western civilization.
(Metzger 2001d:2)
As a rule, Jews produce nothing but take more than anyone else in society.
They are dishonest and litigious too. Most lawyers are Jews. Nobody likes
lawyers. Most of the people who own the banks are Jews.When was the last
time you heard anyone tell you how happy he was with his bank’s rates,
account fees, extraneous charges, etc.
(WAR 2001:6)
These characterisations of Jews as powerful, smart, and financially secure are
reflective ofWARmembers’ sense of inferiority on these dimensions. They resent
that social and political power, which has traditionally been embedded in male
whiteness in the United States, seems to now be beyond their grasp. Perhaps
surprisingly, there is not a single reference in the sample to the conspiracy theory
that Jews were the masterminds behind the 9/11 attacks – a theory that was fairly
prevalent among some in the general American population, as well as in Europe.
Instead, WAR believes that Muslims initiated the attack because the United States
generally supports Israel in Middle East conflicts.
Backing Israel, a group particularly on the outs with most of the civilized
world, is proving highly hazardous to our health in this country. Nowwe have
an entire complex of buildings leveled to the ground with thousands of dead
people. Why? Because the U.S. decided to back the biggest bunch of
parasites on the face of the planet: the Jews.
(Associate 2001a:5)
Discussion
WAR stuck with familiar out-group targets of blacks and Jews after 9/11 instead of
shifting their focus to Arabs. These two groups were likely most salient in WAR
members’ daily lives (although this may now be different in 2011), but this
consistency meant thatWAR lost an opportunity to increase their membership and
sympathisers. Does this mean that WAR was incapable of assessing the social
climate for the benefit of the movement, as some research on the right-wing has
claimed (e.g., Crenshaw 2000)?
Immediately after the attacks, and especially after the implementation of the
PatriotAct in November 2001, the government’s ability to monitor both individual
and organisational communications and activities was greatly increased. Domestic
hate groups like WAR were thought to receive particular attention, and this
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resultant climate of increased surveillance by and distrust of government likely
made WAR members feel they were more distant than ever from their idealised
all-white nation, as seen below.
The Congress and Senate are about to be given cart blanche to kick anyone’s
ass they don’t like, especiallyWhite Separatists. Most will be so afraid when
approached by Thought Police that all the years I have urged people to just
say, I Have Nothing to Say, will go down the drain in a matter of seconds.
(Metzger 2001a:4, emphasis in original)
The reaction [to 9/11] will create a quick move toward an even greater police
state, as the public demands the Iron Heel to protect them.
(Metzger 2001c:2)
These selections indicate that WAR believed the U.S. government was hostile
toward white interests even prior to 9/11, but believed the terror attacks would
exacerbate this and lead to further fragmentation of the WSM. Further, WAR’s
‘worse is better’ scenario had been achieved, at least for a time, when the terrorists
successfully executed a plot that caused thousands of deaths and some degree of
quotidian disruption for almost all Americans. WAR believed an appropriate level
of terror or chaos had been enacted across the United States and saw little reason
to encourage more of the same kind of action that would likely jeopardise their
limited financial and membership resources.
An alternative explanation would be thatWAR responded to the Patriot Act and
increased surveillance with fear, rather than disdain. Under this explanation,WAR
would have avoided mobilisation efforts to reduce the probability of facing
popular criticism and legal scrutiny. However, praising violence as an ideal,
efficacious tactic continued after 9/11, as did rhetoric that was scornful of the
government and its actions. The above quotations also indicate contempt forWSM
members who are intimidated by governmental pressure, and there were no
newsletter items after 9/11 that suggested a shift to a more moderate or cautious
ideology.
Self-censoring thus has less support as an explanation for WAR’s lack of
mobilisation after 9/11 than does resource preservation. Neither explanation
would support the claim that right-wing groups are incapable of assessing social
events for the benefit of the movement. Rather, it was a rational response within the
context of an identity that is experienced as alienated from the nation.
Conclusion
The results here add to the existing knowledge onWSM groups in a few different
ways. First, they provide amodification to Daniel’s (1997) depiction of theWSM’s
understanding of nationalism: not only is it white and predominately male, but
national inclusion is limited to those whites who are willing to take real, violent
action to regain a white state. Second, the results demonstrate that the existing
nationalism theories do not adequately account for the alienation and status loss
experienced by WSM members. Without first understanding the strength and
nature of diaspora WSM members have from an imagined, ethnic nation and the
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violent ends they advocate to achieve it, the nationalism literature would predict
greater attitudinal and behavioural change fromWSMmembers than what is seen
here. Though Flint (2004) does discuss a feeling of diaspora among these groups,
this article presents, to my knowledge, the first systematic analysis of how groups
in theWSM respond to a major event and indicates that groups likely to be targets
of WSM violence do not change much over time.
This consistency in targeted groups illustrates a need for increased attention to
the kinds of groups WSM members have regular interactions with in order to
predict future violent action. For example, a casual observer may have been
completely surprised in the summer of 2009 by the shooting at the D.C. Holocaust
Museum – a Jewish target. However, given what the results here indicate about
WSM targets and sources of threat, an attack on a recognised, visible institution
that represents Jewish and egalitarian interests is to be expected during a time of
heightened economic stress and increased perceived racial threat due to the
presence of the United States’ first black president. Understanding this relatively
fixed pattern of response should allow for better resource allocation in law
enforcement and other groups that seek to limit the harm done by WSM groups.
Since 9/11, there was little activity or resurgence on the part ofWSM groups in
the United States until late 2008 and early 2009. Their self-imposed period of
abeyance ended as the presence of a black First Family undoubtedly increased the
salience of blacks in the lives of white supremacists and heightened their sense of
status loss. There were several public incidents of ‘non-racists’ sending racist
emails and other communications that were derogatory toward Obama and his
family, and while 2008–2009 newsletters were not available at the time of this
draft, chatter on racist websites was at an all-time high around the inauguration.We
also witnessed the first real outbreak of violence perpetuated byWSMmembers in
many years with the murder of an abortion doctor and the shooting at the D.C.
museum. In themonths and years ahead, it is in the best interest of law enforcement
and academics alike to be mindful of the WSM’s sense of status loss and under-
standing of the nation in an effort to anticipate and mitigate future violence.
Notes
1 Some authors have distinguished between supremacist, separatist, and nationalist groups
(e.g., Daniels 1997). I use the umbrella term ‘supremacist’ here because the notion that
whites are superior to all other races is at the root of the supremacist and nationalist
frameworks as well.
2 Sometimes WAR is referred to as a Skinhead group, and racist skinheads are often
understood as a subset of Neo-Nazis that particularly lauds hate music (Daniels 1997;
George andWilcox 1996; Hamm 1993; Kaplan 2000). I prefer the broader term ‘Neo-Nazi’
because ‘Skinhead’ is now often a misnomer due to a push toward mainstream normativity;
modern racists, even Skins, are frequently encouraged to not shave their heads, obtain stark
racist tattoos, or participate in other visible signifiers of their racist identity in order to
appear more ‘normal’ and blend in with mainstream society (see Cooter 2006).
3 The John Birch Society is a libertarian group that purportedly works to defend individual
rights and the U.S. Constitution, but has multiple links to different racist organisations like
the KKK (Lipset and Raab 1978).
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4 Christian Identity claims whites are the true descendants of the biblical Adam, while the
Jews are devious pretenders to the Israelite lineage who were spawned from a liaison
between Eve and Satan (Walters 2000).
5 For WAR, race, ethnicity, and culture are essentially synonymous.
6 Aho also believes the role of religion is essential to right-wing involvement. Notably,
WAR for the most part disdains religious, particularly Christian, participation because they
believe it causes adherents to have an egalitarian, rather than racially-aware, outlook.
7 The goal of this paper is not to debate the definition of ‘white’or ‘whiteness’, but it should
be noted that these terms refer to socially constructed categories that have shifted over time
(Garner 2007). Many social scientists are likewise concerned with reifying these social
categories and the attendant, historical white dominance by studying whiteness or white
supremacist groups without adequately fleshing out these concepts (Ferber 1999). However,
as Brubaker and Cooper (2000:5) note, ‘reification is a social process, not only an intellec-
tual practice’, and this project tries to understand the inner workings of a white supremacist
group – similarly to Weber’s Verstehen. It therefore takes as its starting point the under-
standings of racialised categories as defined by the group itself without addressing their
correspondence to biological or social reality.
8 Newsletters are not printed in January, so two additional, sequential issues are included to
provide the full sample.
9 This ideology is distinct from, though similar to, another philosophyMetzger is known for
advocating: the ‘Third Position’.While ill-defined, supporting theThird Position amounts to
believing that race-conscious whites should draw from the ‘best’ strategies of both the
political right and left and resist both communism and capitalism as strategies designed to
benefit Jews and other white enemies (Berlet and Lyons 2000). The Third Position may be
understood as a further expression of the alienation WAR members feel from much of
mainstream society and politics.
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